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Two Worlds, Neither Perfect: A Comment on 
the Tension Between Legal and Empirical 
Studies 
TIMOTHY M. HAGLE† 
The initial study1 and response2 by Professors Lee 
Epstein, Christopher M. Parker, and Jeffrey A. Segal along 
with the critique3 by Professor Todd E. Pettys provide a good 
example of the tension between traditional legal studies and 
empirical studies that are common in the behavioral social 
sciences.4 Broadly speaking, empirical studies tend to reject 
  
† Associate Professor of Political Science, the University of Iowa. Professor Hagle 
also has a law degree from Thomas M. Cooley Law School. 
 1.  Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker, & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices 
Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First 
Amendment, available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBias.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Epstein et al., In-Group Bias]. The authors 
presented the study at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association. 
 2.  Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker, & Jeffrey A. Segal, A Response to a 
Critique of Our Study on In-Group Bias (Sept. 30, 2014), available at 
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBiasResponse.pdf [hereinafter Epstein 
et al., Response]. 
 3. Todd E. Pettys, Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and the Court’s 
Conservatives: A Critique of the Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 1 
(2015). 
 4. The term empirical can take on slightly different meanings depending on 
the context. It might generally mean a rejection of theory for experience. The 
notion of an empirical legal study might very well reject traditional legal theories, 
but is likely to replace them with theories common to the behavioral sciences, 
such as rational actor theory or the ideologically driven decision-maker. It is 
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traditional legal factors such as precedent and legal 
reasoning as a basis for explaining case outcomes and judicial 
behavior. At the extreme, some behavioral social scientists 
would reject precedent and legal reasoning all together, 
characterizing them as little more than a “veneer of 
objectivity.”5 A second difference between the two types of 
studies is the reliance on the power of large datasets and 
statistical analysis in many empirical studies. Judges may 
very well tell us, for example, that they only decide cases 
based on the law and precedent, but it is hard to argue 
against a study involving hundreds or thousands of cases 
that shows a statistically significant basis for believing 
otherwise.  
Although I could write at some length regarding concerns 
I have with either the study or the critique, given the need to 
keep this Response short I will focus on only two points: use 
of the Supreme Court Database6 and coding the variables. 
I am very familiar with the Supreme Court Database as 
I have used it extensively for many years. It is an immensely 
valuable resource for those doing research on the Supreme 
Court. It does, however, have its limitations.7 For the most 
part, those limitations only become a problem when 
researchers do not recognize the database’s limitations, use 
the database for purposes beyond its capabilities, or when 
those interpreting a study’s results do not understand the 
underlying limitations. One such limitation is that the vast 
majority of cases only have a single entry in the database. A 
single entry per case results in most of the variables only 
being given a single code. This is appropriate for simple 
variables such as the docket number or the immediate lower 
court.8 Such single codes can, however, be a problem when 
  
usually the differing theoretical bases that tends to cause the tension between 
adherents of the two approaches. 
 5. HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING: EXPLANATION AND 
PREDICTION 63-64 (1979). 
 6. SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2015). 
 7. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 3, at 74-75 nn.375-80 and accompanying text. 
 8. See Online Code Book, SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/
documentation.php?s=1 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
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there are multiple parties involved in the litigation, as Pettys 
points out.9 The codes for the litigants in a case will nearly 
always be based on the named party, regardless of other 
parties that join the litigation, not to mention those who file 
as amici. This is important in a study such as that of Epstein 
et al., where the litigants are to be characterized as either 
liberal or conservative.10 This can create a problem in 
instances where parties on one side or the other of the 
litigation may appropriately be characterized as both liberal 
and conservative.11 
Along similar lines, the vast majority of cases in the 
database only have a single entry for the issue or legal 
provision being considered by the Supreme Court. Reasons 
for a case to have multiple entries include more than one 
issue being coded for a case, more than one legal provision 
being considered by the Court, or a split vote among the 
justices on a single issue.12 Regardless of how many entries a 
case has, or how many parties join the case, at some level we 
must rely on the judgment of the researchers to make the 
appropriate coding decisions. That leads us to the second 
point. 
Pettys spends a great deal of his critique pointing out 
what he sees as problems in the basic coding of the cases by 
Epstein et al.13 In essence, part of his criticism has to do with 
the multidimensionality of some of the cases.14 Another 
aspect of Pettys’s critique has to do with forcing what might 
be an indeterminate vote or outcome into a binary 
liberal/conservative coding structure.15  
  
 9. Pettys supra note 3, at 27 n.130 and accompanying text. 
 10. Epstein et al., In-Group Bias, supra note 1, Figure 1 & Table 1. 
 11. Pettys, supra note 3, at 27 nn.130-31 and accompanying text.  
 12. See Current Dataset: 2014 Release 01, SUPREME COURT DATABASE, 
http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). The current online 
version of the database offers four different versions of case centered data based 
on either Supreme Court citation, docket number, multiple issues or legal 
provisions, or split votes. 
 13. See Pettys, supra note 3, Part II. 
 14. See id. Part II.A. 
 15. See id. Part II.B. 
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More generally, the problem is that characterizing 
litigants or votes as liberal or conservative requires a 
subjective judgment. It is true, of course, that many litigants 
and votes can clearly be labeled as liberal or conservative.16 
There are, however, times when the appropriate label is not 
so clear.17 This is particularly so when, as in the Epstein et 
al. study, one is essentially attempting to code what a justice 
perceives the ideological orientation of the litigants to be.18 
Explicit coding rules can help, but even these can be subject 
to interpretation. Incorporating such interpretations into the 
coding can detract from the objective value of the empirical 
study, perhaps even introducing bias on the part of the 
coders.19  
Researchers can take steps to avoid overly subjective 
coding or bias on the part of the coders, but this does not 
guarantee that all such problems are eliminated. At the very 
least, we may still be left with differences of opinion as to 
whether the coding rules are appropriate or whether they 
have been correctly followed in particular instances. Epstein 
et al. made a few corrections based on the challenges by 
Pettys,20 but they dismiss most of Pettys’s challenges as 
“coding disagreements.”21  
Perhaps without realizing it, Epstein et al. have put their 
finger on the precise problem. What constitutes a coding 
disagreement that can be easily dismissed as opposed to 
something more serious? To the extent such disagreements 
exist, whose view should we accept: that of the original 
  
 16. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
For First Amendment issues, if a justice supports the person or entity claiming a 
First Amendment right, that vote is coded liberal. If the justice supports the 
restriction or limitation imposed by the government, the vote is considered 
conservative. Thus, in Tinker the votes of the seven justices who voted in favor of 
the students’ speech rights are coded liberal and those of dissenting Justices 
Black and Harlan are coded conservative. 
 17. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 3, Part II.B–D. 
 18. See, e.g., id. Part IV. 
 19. See id. at 70 n.367 and accompanying text (Pettys speaks of this in terms 
of confirmation bias.).  
 20. See Epstein et al., Response, supra note 2, at 1; see also Pettys, supra note 
3, at 80 n.404 and accompanying text. 
 21. Epstein et al., Response, supra note 2, at 1. 
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researcher or the critic? I am not sure that all such 
disagreements can be eliminated regardless of how careful 
the researcher is or how clear the coding rules are. 
Nevertheless, it is always important to be aware of 
measurement limitations and to not oversell the results. 
Of course, researchers cannot be held responsible for the 
interpretations placed on their research, particularly by 
those outside the academic community who may not be well 
versed in interpreting results of such studies. It is also true 
that not all social science studies are done with the rigor that 
would allow them to be considered reliable efforts. 
Nevertheless, even the best researchers must guard against 
bias in their own procedures and analysis. 
Unfortunately, few empirical studies get an examination 
as thorough as the Epstein et al. study did by Pettys. Even 
when a study makes its dataset available for examination, 
few reviewers or others interested in the results would be 
inclined to dig deeply into it. In most instances, this might 
not matter if the study receives minimal attention. On the 
other hand, when the study gets an unusual amount of 
attention, particularly beyond the usual academic audience,22 
it may be worthwhile to take a closer look at it. Along these 
lines I am reminded of the use of DNA testing as evidence in 
trials. Once the scientific basis for DNA testing was 
established and accepted by courts it became very hard to 
argue against the statistical power of such tests. 
Nevertheless, one can still question the procedures used by 
those gathering DNA evidence or by the labs processing the 
samples. The power of large datasets and statistical analysis 
to uncover patterns in case outcomes and judicial behavior 
cannot be denied, but the procedures used to construct those 
datasets can—and should—be examined to ensure a proper 
level of rigor. This is not a criticism of Epstein et al., but 
rather a recognition that regardless of how accomplished a 
researcher is, it is still worthwhile to closely examine the 
data and methods of the research. 
Returning to the tension between empirical studies and 
traditional legal studies, empiricists might complain that 
  
 22. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 3, at 70 n.366 and accompanying text (where 
Pettys notes how the results of the Epstein et al. study received attention from a 
national media outlet). 
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traditional legal scholars cannot see the forest for the trees, 
meaning that too much attention to individual cases or votes 
can blind one to considerations that emerge on a larger scale. 
Although I believe this to be true, in at least a partial defense 
of traditional legal studies, I would say that to understand 
the forest, one also needs a solid working knowledge of the 
trees. 
